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An emotional deficit in individuals with psychopathy has been regarded as a potential factor in the dis-
inhibition of selfish behaviors, which can be an impediment to a successful life in human society. How-
ever, recent studies in the field of economics have made clear that emotional function is associated with
irrational decision-making. In the present study, to test whether psychopathy may have a positive aspect
in a social setting, we examined the decision-making of college students with high and low tendencies for
psychopathy in the ultimatum game, which illustrates conflict between fairness and economic utility. We
also investigated electrodermal responses to fair and unfair offers for each group. Compared to low psy-
chopathic controls, individuals with a high tendency toward psychopathy more often choose economic
utility by accepting unfair offers. Whereas controls more often exhibited an electrodermal response to
unfair offers compared to fair offers, high psychopathic individuals did not show a similar difference
between the types of offer. The results suggest that the affective deficit of psychopathy might be associ-
ated with insensitivity to unfairness and may contribute to a rational decision to accept unfair offers.
Hence, psychopathy can be rational in some social situations.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Individuals with psychopathy often exhibit antisocial behaviors
with no regard for social norms or relationships with other people
(Cleckley, 1941). According to an evolutional theory, adherence to
social norms or altruistic behaviors would help to build reciprocal
relationships with others, which would play a functional role in
survival through interpersonal interactions (Trivers, 1971). In con-
trast, selfish or antisocial behaviors would be an important imped-
iment to adaptive survival in human societies which have
established norms or standards to penalize such behaviors. Given
the nature of humans and societies, individuals with psychopathy
could be considered social misfits.
Nevertheless, the classic description of psychopathy by Cleckley
said that psychopathic individuals are not only criminals, but also
can be found in any population in society. In line with this, psycho-
pathic traits are found as a sub-clinical continuum in all popula-
tions in a society (Edens, Marcus, Lilienfeld, & Poythress Jr., 2006;
Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995). Furthermore, Lykken (1995)
argued that certain characteristics of psychopathy, such as superfi-
cial charm, volubility, and fearlessness, are seen in successful busi-ll rights reserved.
hology, Graduate School of
o, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya 464-
.ac.jp (T. Osumi).nessmen and academics. Thus, psychopathy itself may not be
decisive in one’s social maladaptation; rather, it may enhance
some types of social success. It has been a mystery why psychop-
athy includes such contradictory aspects as antisocial and success-
ful achievements.
The hallmark of psychopathy is considered to be affective
impairment. Subjects with psychopathy fail to exhibit an electro-
dermal response and show reduced activation of the affective neu-
ral circuit in response to aversive stimuli or distress cues from
other people (Benning, Patrick, & Iacono, 2005; Birbaumer et al.,
2005; Lorber, 2004; Lykken, 1957). Previous researchers have im-
plied that a reduced experience of emotions accompanied by sig-
nals of punishment or distress can result in the disinhibition of
socially deviant behaviors (Blair, 1995; Lykken, 1995). Consistent
with this notion, recent studies in neuroscience and psychology
have noted that emotion plays an important role in inhibiting dis-
advantageous decision-making (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005),
and several studies have shown that individuals with sub-clinical
psychopathic tendencies repeatedly make disadvantageous deci-
sions (e.g., Mitchell, Colledge, Leonard, & Blair, 2002). However, it
is also true that emotional behaviors can result in maladaptive
consequences depending on the circumstances or situation (Shiv,
Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005; Weller, Levin,
Shiv, & Bechara, 2007). For example, it is conceivable that reactions
driven by anger or frustration may cause significant incidents, such
as crimes of passion, even if such emotions stem from social
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interactions, there may be some circumstances which make it easy
for individuals with psychopathy to lead a social life.
The ultimatum game (UG), which is a widely used laboratory
model of economic decision-making, illustrates an interpersonal
situation in which emotional functions of humans can violate eco-
nomical rationality. In a game with only one round, two players – a
proposer and a responder – have to divide a sum of money. If the
responder accepts an offer made by the proposer, the deal goes
ahead. However, if the responder rejects it, neither player gets any-
thing. Based on this simple rule, rational responders should accept
every positive offer because there will be no additional rounds
with the same opponent. However, actual responders often turn
down such a rational decision in favor of an irrational rejection:
an offer below 20–30% of the stake has an approximately 50%
chance of being rejected (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze,
1982). This irrational rejection is considered to be driven by nega-
tive emotions such as anger or frustration in response to unfair
treatment. As support for this notion, the rate of rejection for unfair
offers is positively correlated with activation of the anterior insula
(Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003), a brain region
that is associated with subjective negative emotions (e.g., Critch-
ley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Öhman, & Dolan, 2004).
In addition, skin conductance response (SCR) following unfair
offers has been believed to be a better predictor for irrational rejec-
tion in the UG (van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006). Skin
conductance activity is a reliable measure to assess physiological
arousal mediated by the sympathetic nervous system. Emotional
events prompt greater SCRs than neutral events regardless of
whether they are pleasant or unpleasant (e.g., Bradley, Codispoti,
Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). Accordingly, it is presumable that the
finding by van’t Wout et al. (2006) of SCR associated with rejection
for unfair offers derives from negative emotions. However, individ-
uals with psychopathy often exhibit deficient SCR in the aversive
conditioning (Lykken, 1957) or during passive viewing of affective
pictures, particularly unpleasant pictures (Benning et al., 2005),
which suggests that they are less likely to be sensitive to negative
emotional events.
Therefore, in the present study we determined whether individ-
uals with high psychopathic tendencies in a non-forensic popula-
tion rationally accept or irrationally reject unfair offers as a
responder in the single-shot UG. Moreover, to investigate emo-
tional responses to offers, we recorded electrodermal activity fol-
lowing an offer as an autonomic index of the emotional state
during decision-making. Furthermore, since the average time ta-
ken to accept is normally 3–4 s for fair offers and 6–7 s for unfair
offers (Knoch, Pascual-Leon, Meyer, Treyer, & Fehr, 2006), the time
that responders are allowed to spend in decision-making might af-
fect their response, despite the individual’s preferences. Thus, less
time may cause an error and more time may enable a deliberate
decision which would override an initial preference. According to
the findings by Knoch et al. (2006), 8.0 s would be enough time
to make deliberate decisions for unfair offers. Meanwhile, it might
be difficult for responders to override an initial preference if time
allotted for making decisions is 3.0 s, or if they have to make deci-
sions more immediately after receiving offers (e.g., 0.5 s). However,
if psychopathic traits could affect a preference, differences in the
acceptance rate between subjects with high and low psychopathic
tendencies should be observed whenever they are required to ex-
press their decisions. To test this notion we controlled the time
that could be spent in decision-making among subjects, and
manipulated it by randomly setting the duration of each trial as
0.5 s, 3.0 s, or 8.0 s.
The affective impairment of individuals with psychopathy is
likely to enhance a rational decision to accept an unfair offer in
the UG. If individuals with high psychopathy fail to exhibit nega-tive emotions, they would not show greater SCR in response to un-
fair offers compared to fair offers. On the other hand, individuals
with acquired sociopathy, who exhibit many of the same behaviors
as subjects with psychopathy (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2002), due to le-
sion of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), have been
found to accept unfair offers less often than healthy controls (Koe-
nigs & Tranel, 2007; Moretti, Dragone, & di Pellegrino, 2009).
Therefore, we could not rule out the possibility that individuals
with psychopathy would overreact to unfair offers; i.e., compared
to low psychopathic individuals, they may be more likely to irratio-
nally reject unfair offers regardless of whether or not they exhibit
SCR in response to these offers.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty-eight participants were recruited from among 128 Jap-
anese college students who consented to participate in the current
study, out of 700 who completed the Japanese version of the Pri-
mary and Secondary Psychopathy Scales (PSPS: Levenson et al.,
1995; Sugiura & Sato, 2005) during a screening session. The high
psychopathic group consisted of 12 students (5 females), and the
low psychopathic group consisted of 16 students (8 females). The
mean ages were 19.1 (SD = 0.49) years for the psychopathic group
and 19.1 (SD = 1.27) years for the low psychopathic group. All of
the participants were confirmed to have no knowledge of the UG
or other economic game theories.
We defined individuals who scored high on primary psychopa-
thy as being psychopathic because the specific properties of psy-
chopathy correspond to primary psychopathy; in contrast,
secondary psychopathy has been defined as an aspect of another
psychiatric disorder (Karpman, 1948; Lykken, 1995). Thus, we re-
cruited a similar number of male and female participants from ex-
treme ends of students who scored high and low on primary
psychopathy. Moreover, based on descriptive statistics of the score
for 700 students (M = 34.37, SD = 4.58), each students scoring over
38.95 and below 34.37 were assigned to the high psychopathic
group and the low psychopathic (non-psychopathic) group, respec-
tively. The scores on the primary psychopathy scale were 39–48
(M = 42.17, SD = 3.04) for the high psychopathic group and 20–34
(M = 30.19, SD = 3.92) for the low group. A t test showed a signifi-
cant difference in the mean score of primary psychopathy between
the two groups, t(26) = 8.78, p < 0.01. Meanwhile, for secondary
psychopathy, the scores were 17–32 (M = 23.67, SD = 5.00) for
the high group and 17–28 (M = 22.44, SD = 3.86) for the low group,
and there was no significant difference between the means of the
groups, t(26) = 0.74, p = 0.47.2.2. Psychopathy assessment
The PSPS is a 26-item measure designed to detect psychopathic
traits in a non-institutionalized population. Each item is a state-
ment that is to be rated on a four-point Likert-type scale (from dis-
agree strongly to agree strongly). The primary psychopathy
subscale consists of 16 items related to manipulation, egocentricity
and lack of empathy and remorse, whereas the secondary subscale
consists of 10 items related to impulsivity, quick-temperedness
and poor behavioral control. Consistent with a two-factor model
of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991), primary
psychopathy, but not secondary psychopathy, was correlated neg-
atively with harm avoidance (Levenson et al., 1995). Furthermore,
the PSPS demonstrated adequate reliability and convergent valid-
ity with alternative measures of psychopathy (Brinkley, Schmitt,
Smith, & Newman, 2001; Lynam, Whiteside, & Jones, 1999). A Jap-
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for the items (Sugiura & Sato, 2005) and demonstrated the same
factor structure, construct validity, and adequate test–retest reli-
ability (Osumi, Kanayama, Sugiura, & Ohira, 2007). Coefficient al-
phas in our screening session were .79 for primary psychopathy
and .60 for secondary psychopathy, which were approximately
equivalent to those in Levenson et al. (1995).2.3. Procedure
The participants played the UG as responders and received 30
offers from 30 different proposers (half of the proposers were fe-
male). In each trial, 1000 Japanese yen was divided between two
players. Half of the offers were fair (¥500:¥500) and the others
were unfair (six ¥700:¥300; six ¥800:¥200; three ¥900:¥100). In
accordance with previous studies (e.g., Koenigs & Tranel, 2007),
the participants were told that the offers had been selected from
the results of a survey of other students that had been completed
previously and that the proposers’ faces had been photographed
though the proposers and the offers were actually set by the exper-
imenter. It has been confirmed that this procedure validly evokes
subjective emotions (Osumi & Ohira, 2009). Participants were in-
structed that they would receive 10% of the total amount of gain
according to their decisions during the 30 trials.
The task began after a three-minute relaxation period. In each
trial, a fixation point was initially presented for 5 s. The photo-
graph of the proposer’s face was randomly shown for 1 s and the
fixation point was presented again for 7 s. An offer was then pre-
sented randomly followed by the response cue. The time interval
between an offer and the response cue was also set randomly as
0.5, 3.0, or 8.0 s. When the cue was displayed, participants re-
sponded as fast as possible by pressing the left (acceptance) or
right (rejection) button with their dominant hand, and feedback
was presented for 1 s (Fig. 1).2.4. Skin conductance measurement and analysis
Electrodermal activity was recorded during the task using an
SCL/R unit (DA-2; Vega Systems, Japan) which used a constant
0.5 V. In addition, disposable Ag/AgCl electrodes (Vitrode F-150;
Nihon Kohden, Japan) filled with gelled isotonic electrolytes were
attached to the palmar surface of the index and middle fingers of
the nondominant hand. The data, which were stored on a hard disc,
were analyzed offline using software (Acknowledge; Biopac Sys-
tems, Santa Barbara, CA, USA).Fig. 1. Time line for a single triOur purpose of measuring SCR was to investigate sensitivity to
offers. However, the task of the present study was not passive
viewing, but decision-making for offers, which allowed us to pre-
dict that amplitudes of the late SCR during viewing offers would
be influenced by internal factors such as conflict, rather than sen-
sitivity to external stimuli. Therefore, because it was necessary to
analyze the SCR that was earlier evoked, SCR was defined as the
change from the onset to the peak of the response within 0.5–3 s
following offer onset in the 3.0 s and the 8.0 s conditions. The SCRs
in the 0.5 s condition was excluded from analyses because SCR
ordinarily starts after 0.5 s or later following stimulus onset. A
log transformation (log [SCR + 1]) was performed to normalize
SCR data (Venables & Christie, 1980).3. Results
3.1. Acceptance rate for unfair offers
To test the group differences in preference for monetary utility
rather than fairness in each condition of time allotted for making
decisions, we conducted a mixed-model analysis of variance (ANO-
VA) for the acceptance rate of unfair offers with the two groups of
psychopathic tendency (high and low) as a between-subject factor
and the three conditions of time allotted for the decision (0.5, 3.0,
and 8.0 s) as a within-subject factor. As expected, we found a sig-
nificant main effect for psychopathic tendencies, F(1, 26) = 7.46,
p < 0.01, g2p = 0.22, indicating that the high psychopathy group
showed a higher acceptance rate for unfair offers (43.8%
[SD = 16.4%]) than the low group (25.0% [SD = 16.4%]). With regard
to the time allotted for making decisions, there was no main effect,
F(2, 52) = 0.81, p = 0.45, g2p = 0.03, or interaction according to psy-
chopathic tendencies, F(2, 52) = 0.07, p = 0.93, g2p = 0.003 (Table 1).
Fig. 2 shows the relation between the individuals’ total accep-
tance rates of unfair offers and scores on the primary psychopathy
scale. The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient sup-
ported our hypothesis that the responder was more likely to accept
unfair offers as their tendency for psychopathy (primary psychop-
athy) increased, r = 0.55, p < 0.001. On the other hand, the accep-
tance rate did not correlate with the tendency for secondary
psychopathy, r = 0.15, p = 0.22.
3.2. Skin conductance
For SCR, we conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA to
test the difference between fair and unfair offers in both the highal of the ultimatum game.
Table 1
Mean acceptance rates for unfair offers for each time allotted for making decisions
(%).
Time allotted for making decisions
0.5 s 3.0 s 8.0 s
Psychopathic 40.0 (23.1) 45.0 (18.5) 43.3 (21.3)
Non-psychopathic 21.2 (18.0) 26.2 (24.2) 27.5 (19.8)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Fig. 2. Scatter plot depicting the correlation between the score of psychopathy and
the acceptance rate for unfair offers. The dark and light points indicate the
psychopathic and non-psychopathic groups, respectively.
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interaction between fairness and group, F(1, 26) = 3.68, p = 0.07,
g2p = 0.12, indicating that while the low psychopathic group
showed a greater SCR in response to unfair offers compared to fair
offers, t(15) = 2.62, p = 0.02, the high psychopathic group did not,
t(11) = 0.16, p = 0.88 (Fig. 3). A correlational analysis also sup-
ported the relationship between psychopathic tendency and emo-
tional hypo-arousal: the Pearson coefficient indicated that the
psychopathic tendency was negatively correlated with the differ-
ence in the SCR in response to unfair vs. fair offers, r = 0.29,
p = 0.07 (one-tailed).
Moreover, we tested the correlation between the acceptance
rate and the difference in the SCR in response to unfair vs. fairPsychopathic Non-psychopathic
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Fig. 3. Mean standardized values of the skin conductance response associated with
fair (white bar) and unfair offers (black bar) in the psychopathic and non-
psychopathic groups. Error bars show standard errors.offers. An analysis of Pearson’s correlation coefficient revealed a
significant relation: participants who accepted fewer unfair offers
exhibited a greater SCR in response to unfair offers compared to
fair offers, r = 0.37, p = 0.03 (one-tailed).
4. Discussion
In the single-shot UG, individuals with a high tendency toward
psychopathy more often accepted unfair offers than those with a
low tendency. This behavioral pattern was observed regardless of
whether the subjects were required to express their decisions
immediately or late. Although random assignment of time inter-
vals during the trials might influence the decision-making process
of participants, it was sure that in the 3.0 s and the 8.0 s condi-
tions, participants had longer intervals to change strategies after
the offers were presented. Despite this, their acceptance rates
were not different among these conditions. Additionally, since
the score of secondary psychopathy representing impulsivity
was equal in both groups and not correlated with acceptance rate,
it is difficult to explain the higher acceptance rate in high psycho-
pathic individuals as a consequence of impulsivity. Therefore, the
present findings suggest that their decisions represent their pref-
erences as affected by psychopathic traits, and are neither errors
arising from immediate decision-making nor the results of
deliberation.
While individuals with a low tendency toward psychopathy
showed a greater SCR in response to unfair vs. fair offers as a de-
fault, high psychopathic individuals showed equal amplitudes of
SCR in response to both fair and unfair offers. SCR is often modu-
lated by emotional arousal (Bradley et al., 2001). In addition, a low-
er SCR was associated with a higher acceptance rate, which may
support an emotional reason for irrational rejection (Sanfey et al.,
2003; van’t Wout et al., 2006) Therefore, although we did not mea-
sure subjective ratings for emotions or subjective fairness, the
present results of an autonomic index allow us to suggest more
objectively and strongly that individuals with psychopathy are
insensitive to violation of a fairness norm. This interpretation is
consistent with the previous notion that the core of psychopathy
is affective dysfunction. Specifically, dysfunction of the amygdala
has been considered to play a central role in the emergence of psy-
chopathy (Blair, 2006). Consistent with this position, a previous
study reported that psychopathic traits were related to reduced
activation of the amygdala during a moral judgment task (Glenn,
Raine, & Schug, 2009). While there have been no empirical findings
regarding the activation and deactivation of the amygdala during
decision-making in the UG, activation of the amygdala, which is
positively correlated with subjective arousal, predicts an individ-
ual’s determination of magnitudes of punishment for criminal sce-
narios (Buckholtz et al., 2008). Those findings permit us to
speculate that poor affective processing related to the amygdala
as a function of psychopathy may reduce the sensitivity to a viola-
tion of a fairness norm and/or may make responders lose interest
in rejecting unfair offers.
Although the VMPFC has also been considered to be one of the
neural bases of psychopathy (Blair, 2006), the rational acceptance
of unfair offers by individuals with psychopathy is evidently incon-
sistent with previous findings in patients with lesion of the VMPFC
(Koenigs & Tranel, 2007; Moretti et al., 2009). In the previous stud-
ies, individuals with psychopathy have shown behavioral patterns
similar to those of VMPFC patients in economic decision-making
(e.g., Mitchell et al., 2002) and reduced activation of the VMPFC
during emotional tasks with either a social or non-social domain
(e.g., Birbaumer et al., 2005; Rilling et al., 2007). Despite these find-
ings, psychopathy does not seem to be associated with a deficit in
reward processing, which has been suggested to be a functional
role of the VMPFC, specifically for responders in the UG (Moretti
T. Osumi, H. Ohira / Personality and Individual Differences 49 (2010) 451–456 455et al., 2009; Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008), since intact po-
sitive emotions have been reported for psychopathy (e.g., Benning
et al., 2005). Some characteristics of psychopathic traits, which are
not related to the function of the VMPFC, might positively affect
the rational behavioral pattern. Machiavellianism, for example,
roughly, but not fully, overlaps the concept of psychopathy
(McHoskey, Worzel, & Szyarto, 1998; Paulhus & Williams, 2002),
and Machiavellian people are likely to show the same strategic
decision-making in the single-shot UG as individuals with psy-
chopathy (Meyer, 1992). However, further studies are required to
understand the uniqueness of psychopathy because Machiavellian
people differ from psychopaths in that some cases show social
preferences and emotional responding (Spitzer, Fischbacher,
Herrnberger, Grön, & Fehr, 2007).
The rejection of unfair offers has been considered to be a pun-
ishment for norm violators (Fehr & Gachter, 2002) or inequity aver-
sion (Page & Nowak, 2000). According to these theories, responders
expect to gain more profits in long-term future interactions if they
pay the present cost for the punishment or inequity aversion. On
the other hand, if responders do not so, they will fail to correct
the opponent’s behavior and damage their reputation, which may
increase the risk of repeating this unfair treatment. As can be seen
in the present study, however, psychopathic individuals less often
accept the costs of the rejection of unfair offers, which could be
interpreted as indicating that they ignore long-term reciprocal
strategies in interpersonal interactions. A similar behavioral ten-
dency has been reported by a study using the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Thus, despite the risk of a breakdown in a cooperative relationship
with a partner, psychopathic men were more likely to defect for a
short-term gain by taking a free ride on the partner’s cost for coop-
eration (Rilling et al., 2007). Given this seeming fixation for short-
term benefits, psychopathy may still be considered as nothing
more than a maladaptive concept in our social life.
Nevertheless, in the single-shot UG, a responder has no further
chances to interact with the same proposer. Thus, paying a cost for
the rejection of unfair treatment can be regarded as vengeance for
nothing since there is no way that the responder will receive reci-
procal gains, either directly or indirectly. In this sense, the single-
shot UG can be considered a situation in which the regulation of
an emotional reaction is required for adaptive decision-making in
a social interaction. Therefore, the acceptance of any offer could
be defined as success since this is the only method to maximize
gains within the ‘ultimatum’ bargaining. From this perspective,
we demonstrated that individuals with psychopathy selected the
rational solution in social exchanges with others. This finding sup-
ports the previous implication that there are some cases in which
individuals with psychopathy show successful aspects (Cleckley,
1941; Lykken, 1995). Accordingly, we conclude that affective
impairment of psychopathy is not necessarily maladaptive, but
can be linked to adaptive outcomes in society.Acknowledgment
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